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STATEMENT OF PARTIES 
American West Bank acquired Far West Bank which formerly did business in Utah 
for many years. American West Bank was conducting business in Utah as American West 
Bank until approximately November 2, 2015 when it merged with Banner Bank. To 
avoid confusion Appellee will refer to Banner Bank, American West Bank and Far West 
Bank as "Banner Bank" or "the Bank". Michael L. Robertson ("Robertson") is a pro se 
defendant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Bank does not dispute that this Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 to review the deficiency judgment signed and entered and 
by the Fourth District Court, State of Utah, against Defendant Robertson pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32, Judge David Mortensen presiding. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Bank supplements the Standards of Review cited by Appellant Mike L. 
Robertson ("Robertson") as follows: 
1. When a written contract is unambiguous, the Court should look no further 
than the plain meaning of the contractual language. See Cent. Florida Inv., Inc. v. 
Parkwest Assoc., 2002 UT 3, ,I12, 40 P.3d 599. (The "Parol Evidence Standard"). 
2. This Court reviews the district court's "legal conclusions for correctness, 
granting [them] no particular deference." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 
255 (Utah App 1997). (The "Correctness Standard"). 
1 
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3. Where there are mixed questions of law and fact and this Court is 
reviewing the district court's decision as to whether the facts come within the reach of the 
applicable law, this Court "review[s] legal questions for correct11,ess [but] ... may grant a 
trial court discretion in the application of the law to a given fact situation". Covey v. 
Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ~ 17,486 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (quoting Jeff v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 
1234, 1244 (Utah 1998)); see also Jensen v. lHC Hospitals, Inc., 2003 UT 51, ~ 57,486 
Utah Adv. Rep. 60 ("If a case involves a mixed question of fact and law, we afford some 
measure of discretion to the [trial] court's application of law to facts.") (quoting State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ~ 26, 63 P.3d 650) (The "Application of Law to Facts Standard"). 
4. Factual findings are subject to the clear error standard. Because a trial 
court is in a better position to judge credibility and resolve evidentiary conflicts, an 
appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error. Westmont 
Residential LLC v. Buttars, 2014 UT App 291, ~ 9,340 P.3d 183 (quoting State v. Levin, 
2006 UT 50, ~ 20, 144 P.3d 1096 ("'Because a trial court is in a better position to judg[e] 
credibility and resolv[ e] evidentiary conflicts, an appellate court reviews the trial court's 
findings of fact for clear error"'), State v. Finlayson, 2014 UT App 282, ~ 18 ( quoting 
Salt Lake City v. Maloch, 2013 UT App 249, ~ 2 ("'when reviewing a bench trial for 
sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against 
the clear weight of the evidence, or if we [the appellate court] otherwise reach a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'"), State v. Davie, 2011 UT App 300, 
~ 18, 264 P.3d 770 ("Upon review, we accord deference to the trial court's ability and 
opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor."), id., ("Because the trial court had the 
2 
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opportunity to view these witnesses and weigh their credibility, we defer to its findings 
unless the record demonstrates clear error.") (alteration in original) ( citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Deseret First Federal Credit Union v. Parkin, 2014 UT App 
207, iJ 15 ("We review the court's factual findings for clear error".) (The "Clear Error or 
Clearly Erroneous Standard"). 
5. The admission of evidence is reviewed under an abuse of oiscretion 
standard. Avalos v. TL Custom, LLC, 2014 UT App 156, iJ 19,330 P.3d 727. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that because a trial court has broad discretion to admit or 
exclude evidence, a Utah appellate court ''will disturb its [the trial court's] ruling only for 
an abuse of discretion."' Id., ( quoting Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, iJ 21, 190 P .3d 
1209). "Even when evidence is improperly admitted, reversal is required only where the 
admission of the evidence amounted to prejudicial error." Id. (citing Larsen v. Johnson, 
958 P.2d 953,958 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). (The "Abuse of Discretion Standard"). 
6. On appeal, "[t]he burden is on tqe appellant to not only show that there was 
an error, but that it was prejudicial to the extent that there is reasonable likelihood that in 
its absence there would have been a different result." Joseph v. W. H Groves Latter Day 
Saints Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94,348 P.2d 935 (1960); see also Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 
2d 296,383 P.2d 406 (1963); see also Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp. 27 Utah 
2d 188; 493 P.2d 1283 (1972); see also Redevelopment Agency v. Mistui Inv. Inc., 522 
P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974) ("The burden is upon the appellant to show not only that there 
was error, but that it was substantial and prejudicial .... ") (The "Harmless Error 
Standard"). 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal arises from a deficiency action brought after the non-judicial 
foreclosure of real property situated on the eastern hillside near Springville City, Utah. 
Robertson borrowed money from the Bank and executed the loan documents, including 
promissory notes, trust deeds and a business loan agreement (the "Loan"). Robertson 
failed to repay the Loan. Round Peak Natural Seed Farms, Ltd, a limited or general 
partnership, executed two trust deeds at separate times on four adjacent parcels of real 
property to secure two separate promissory notes made in 2006 and 2007. The two 
promissory notes were consolidated into a single promissory note for $669,726.32. 
Robertson defaulted on the Loan by failing to pay the 2009 promissory note. Proper 
notice of default was given under the two trust deeds. After Robertson failed to cure the 
defaults with the time provided for by law, the trust properties were noticed for sale. 
After notices of sale were properly posted, served and published, the trust deeds were 
foreclosed. The trust properties were sold at the two foreclosure sales. A deficiency 
action was timely commenced against Robertson. The district court granted partial 
summary judgment as to the loan balance prior to the foreclosure and ruled that the 
foreclosures were properly conducted. The district court conducted a trial and 
determined the fair market value of the trust properties at the time of the foreclosure 
sales. The fair market value of the trust property at the time of the foreclosure sales was 
less than the loan balance and the court entered a deficiency judgment against Robertson 
for the balance. 
4 
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When the Bank commenced the deficiency action against Robertson, Robertson 
filed a counterclaim against the Bank. The counterclaim related to a separate ACH 
Agreement that was not part of the 2009 Note or the foreclosed trust deeds. The 
counterclaim alleged four claims for relief including ( 1) breach of contract, (2) breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) negligence and ( 4) unjust 
enrichment. Robertson's counterclaim was based on the allegation that the Bank acted 
improperly when it terminated the ACH Agreement. However, the Bank terminated the 
ACH Agreement according to its terms which provided that Robertson or the Bank could 
terminate the ACH Agreement by giving 10 days written notice. The Bank gave 
Robertson 20 days written notice. The district court granted summary judgment 
dismissing Robert's four counterclaims. The court determined that the ACH Agreement 
was properly terminated according to its terms, that there was no implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing that contradicted the mutual right of termination, that the 
negligence claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine and that there was no claim 
for unjust enrichment because there were written loan documents and agreement 
addressing the issues. 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
After the non-judicial foreclosure sales of the two trust deeds were completed the 
Bank commenced a deficiency action against Robertson pursuant to 57-1-32 under each 
of the trust deeds to recover the deficiency balance. In response, Robertson filed an 
answer and counterclaim. In his counterclaim Robertson alleged four claims for relief 
including: ( 1) breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant and fair dealing, 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
negligence and unjust enrichment. The Bank moved for partial summary judgment on 
the Bank's claims for relief and full summary judgment on Robertson's counterclaim. 
After notice and hearing the district court granted partial summary judgment on Banner's 
claims for relief and summary judgment against Robertson's counterclaim. The district 
court also granted partial summary judgment on the Bank's deficiency claim on the 2009 
promissory note. The district court's summary judgment against Robertson's 
counterclaim and partial summary judgment in favor of the Bank is attached as the 
Bank's Addendum, Tab A. Thereafter, the district court conducted a bench trial to 
determine the fair market value of the trust properties at the time of the foreclosure sales. 
At trial court received oral testimony from the Bank's employee, the Bank's expert 
witness and Robertson. The court also received an appraisal report and other 
documentary evidence. The court refused to consider testimony from an appraiser who 
Robertson had failed to disclose prior to the trial in compliance with the court's final 
pretrial order, and which he further failed to disclose at the commencement of the trial or 
prior to the time the court had dismissed the Bank's expert witness. After the conclusion 
of the trial the Court signed and entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment against Robertson (the "Judgment"). A copy of the Judgment is attached hereto 
as Addendum, Tab B. Robertson filed a motion for a new trial. The district court signed 
an order denying the motion on May 27, 2015. After the trial, and prior to its order 
denying a new trial, Robertson filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy case. After hearing, the 
bankruptcy court indicated that any right to appeal the district court's Judgment was 
abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee to Robertson. 
6 
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C. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
1. Disposition of The Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on its 
Deficiency Claims. 
On April 25, 2013, the district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of 
the Bank. (R.000689-000684). 1 The court determined that the balance owing on the 
2009 promissory note was undisputed and that the foreclosures sales were property 
conducted. (R.000688-000685). The court ruled: 
[3.] Far West's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Robertson is 
granted all on issues and claims with the exception that the Court will conduct a brief 
evidentiary hearing to determine the balance owing to Far West by Defendant Robertson 
under the 2009 Note and the fair market value of the trust properties at the time of the 
foreclosure sales; (R.000685) 
2. Disposition of The Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment against 
Robertson's Counterclaim. 
Based upon the uncontroverted facts and undisputed documents, the district court 
concluded the counterclaim filed by Robertson should be dismissed. The court 
concluded in part as follows: 
8. The counterclaim in negligence against Far West should be dismissed because 
it is barred by the economic loss doctrine as that doctrine has been applied by the 
Utah courts. In addition, Robertson stipulated at hearing that the negligence claim 
against Far West could be dismissed with prejudice. 
9. Defendant Robertson does not have a claim for breach of contract arising from 
the foreclosure of the Trust Deeds, the cancellation of the ACH Agreement or any 
other loan document or Agreement. The ACH Agreement unequivocally provided 
that either party could cancel the agreement within ten ( 10) days' notice. The 
facts are undisputed that Far West gave more than twenty (20) days' notice of 
cancellation of the ACH Agreement to Defendant Robertson and therefore Far 
West fully complied with the termination terms of the ACH Agreement. 
1 The index of the record does not does not accurately reflect the title of this 
document. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10. Because the Far West Trust Deeds were foreclosed in compliance with their 
terms and applicable Utah law and because Far West terminated the ACH 
Agreement pursuant to its terms, Far West did not breach any implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in connection with any of the foregoing documents or 
agreements. 
11. The Court also rejects Defendant Robertson's argument that the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be treated as tort-type claim or that an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may contradict specific written 
terms of an agreement. 
12. Utah law bars a claim for unjust enrichment when there are written 
agreements governing the subject matter upon which the unjust enrichment claim 
is based. The facts are undisputed that there were written loan agreements made 
between Far West and Defendant Robertson concerning the subject matter of 
Defendant Robertson's unjust enrichment claim. Therefore, Defendant 
Robertson's claim for unjust enrichment should be dismissed with prejudice. 
(R.000687-000686)(Tab A) 
3. Disposition of the Trial on The Bank's Deficiency Claims. 
The district court conducted a trial on July 2, 2013. The court received oral 
testimony from the Bank's employee, the Bank's appraiser and Robertson. The court 
also received an appraisal report and other documentary evidence. At trial the court 
refused to allow Robertson to call an undisclosed witness. Neither the appraiser or her 
opinions had been disclosed in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 26, the court's final 
pretrial order, at the commencement of trial or prior to the release of the Bank's witness. 
After considering the evidence at trial the court determined the fair market value of the 
trust properties at the time of the foreclosure sales and the deficiency owing under the 
2009 promissory note. The district court signed and entered a Judgment Against Mike L. 
Robertson (the "Judgment") on September 11, 2013 ( R.001101-001096). The Judgment 
is attached hereto as Addendum Tab 2. The district court concluded, in part: 
8 
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27. Based upon the testimony presented at trial and the documents received into 
evidence, the Court concludes by a preponderance of evidence that the total indebtedness 
owing by Defendant Robertson at the time the trust property was foreclosed on June 1, 
2011 was $693,513.97. · 
29. Based upon the testimony given at trial and the documents received into evidence, 
the Court concludes that the fair market value of the property in the amount of $340,000 
at the time of the foreclosure sales was less than the $403,000 amount credit-bid by 
American West for the purchase of the Trust Property. Therefore the indebtedness was 
reduced by an amount greater than the fair market value of the Property. 
30. Based upon the foregoing, the deficiency balance owing to American West as of July 
1, 2013 was $416,216.80. (R.001095) 
The district court also entered judgment for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in favor of the 
Bank based upon the loan documents and Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. 
D. Statement of Facts. 
1. On August 21, 2006, Robertson executed a promissory note ("2006 Note") in 
the amount of$230,000 in favor of Far West (i.e., Banner) in exchange for a loan of 
$230,000.00. (R.001100) A copy of the 2006 Note is attached to The Bank's complaint. 
(R.000070-000069). Admitted in 116 and 7 of Robertson Answer ("Answer") (R.000106). 
2. On August 21, 2006, Round Peak Natural Seed Farms, Ltd. as Trustor, by and 
through its general partner, Robertson, executed a Revolving Credit Deed of Trust ("2006 
Trust Deed") in favor of the Bank, as trustee and beneficiary to secure the 2006 Note which 
matured September 1, 2007.(R.001100) A copy of the 2006 Trust Deed is Exhibit B to the 
complaint. (R.000067-000059); Answer, ,19, 10 (R.000106). 
3. The 2006 Trust Deed granted to Trustee, the power to sell the real property 
described therein on Exhibit A as 67.4 acres of hillside land at approximately 500 North 
1100 East, Springville, Utah. (R.001100) 
9 
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4. The 2006 Trust Deed was recorded August 22, 2006, as Entry 109306:2006 
in the Utah County Recorder's Office. (R.001100) 
5. On October 6, 2006 Round Peak Natural Seed Farms, Ltd. by and through its 
general partner Mike Robertson, executed a Modification of Deed of Trust ("Modification") 
increasing the Trust Deed from $230,000.00 to $500,000.00. (R.001100) The Modification 
is Exhibit C to the Complaint. (R.000058-000054) The Modification was recorded 
October 10, 2006, Entry No. 134222:2006 in the Utah County Recorder's Office. 
(R.001100) 
6. On September 12, 2007, Robertson executed a promissory note ("2007 
Note") in the amount of $250,000.00 in favor of Far West (i.e., Banner) in exchange for a 
loan in the sum of $250,000.00. (R.001100-001099) A copy of the 2007 Note is Exhibit D 
to the Complaint. (R.000054-000051); Answer, ,117, 18 (R.000105). 
7. On September 12, 2007 Robertson, as general partner of Round Peak Natural 
Seed Farms, Ltd., as Truster, executed a Revolving Credit Deed of Trust ("2007 Trust 
Deed") in favor of the Bank as trustee and beneficiary to secure the payment of a revolving 
line of credit. (R.001099) A copy of the 2007 Trust Deed is Exhibit E to the Complaint. 
(R.000050-000041 ). Answer,, 18, 19 (R.000105). 
8. The 2007 Trust Deed granted to the Trustee the power to sell the Trust 
Property described therein. (R.001099) It was recorded September 13, 2007, as entry No. 
134636:2007 in the Utah County Recorder's Office. (Id.) 
9. On April 23, 2009, Robertson executed a promissory note ("2009 Note") in 
the amount of $669,726.32 in favor of the Bank in exchange for the Bank lending to 
10 
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Robertson the sum of$669,726.32. (R.001099) A copy of the 2009 Note is Exhibit F to the 
Complaint. (R.000040-000037); Answer, 1, 22, 23 (R.000105). 
10. On April 23, 2009, Robertson entered into Business Loan Agreement with 
Far West in the principal amount of $669,726.32 (the "Loan Agreement"). (See R.001099) 
11. The obligations owing under the 2009 Note and Loan Agreement were 
secured by the 2006 Trust Deed as modified and the 2007 Trust Deed (collectively the Trust 
Deeds). (R.000067-000041) (The 2009 Note, the 2009 Loan Agreement, the 2006 Trust 
Deed and the 2007 Trust Deed are referred collectively as the "Loan Documents".) 
12. Certain events of default occurred under the Loan Documents in that 
Robertson failed to timely make payments as required under the 2009 Promissory Note, the 
2006 Trust Deed, as modified, and the 2007 Trust Deed. (R.001099) 
13. Notices of Default were recorded on January 13, 2011, as Entry 4120:2011 
and as Entry 4122:2011 with the Utah County Recorder's Office and served upon 
Robertson as Borrower and Round Peak Natural Seed Farms Ltd. as Truster under the two 
Trust Deeds. (R.001099) Copies of the Notices of Default are Exhibits J and K to the 
Complaint. (R.000023-000018) 
14. Robertson failed to cure the defaults that arose under the 2009 Note which 
was secured by the 2006 Trust Deed as modified, and the 2007 Trust Deed. (R.001099) 
15. As a result, the trust properties securing the 2009 Note were formally noticed 
for sale. (R.001099-001098) Copies of the two Notices of Trustee's Sale are attached to 
the Complaint as Exhibits L and M. (R.000016-000009) 
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16. The Notices of Trustee's Sale were served on Robertson and Round Peak 
Natural Seed Farms, Ltd and published and posted as required by Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-
25 and Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26. (R.001099) 
17. As the time of the Trustee's Sales, the amount owing to the Bank under the 
2009 Note and 2009 Loan Agreement was no less than $693,513.97. (R.001098) 
18. Under the terms of the 2007 Trust Deed, the Trustee sold the trust properties 
to the Bank on June 1,201 I for the sum of $135,000. 
19. After the Trustee's Sale under the 2007 Trust Deed, the amount owing on the 
2009 Note prior to additional attorney's fees and costs was no less than $558,513.97. 
(R.001098) 
20. Because of the remaining balance owing, the Trustee foreclosed the 2006 
Trust Deed as modified, on June 1, 2011. (R.001098) 
21. Under the terms of the 2006 Trust Deed, the Trustee sold the trust properties 
to the Bank for a credit bid of $268,000. (R.001098) ~ 
22. The Trustee's Deed relating to the foreclosure sale under the 2006 Trust Deed 
was executed by the Trustee and recorded on June 6, 2011 as Entry 41867:2011. 
(R.001098) 
23. The Trustee's Deed relating to the foreclosure sale under the 2007 Trust Deed 
was executed by the Trustee and recorded on June 6, 2011 as Entry 41868:2011. ~ 
(R.001098) 
24. Copies of the Trustee's Deeds are Exhibits N and Oto the Bank's Complaint. 
(R.000007-000002). 
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@. 
25. After the Trust Deeds were foreclosed, the Bank timely commenced a 
deficiency action against Robertson pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. (R.001098) 
26. The Bank alleged in its complaint that the combined credit bids of 
$403,000 made by the Bank at the foreclosure sales were greater in amount than the fair 
market value of the Trust Property. (R.001098). 
27. Thereafter, the Bank moved for partial summary judgment on the 
deficiency amount owing by Robertson under the 2009 Note. (R.000326-000323) 
28. The district court granted the Bank's motion for partial summary judgment. 
A copy of the district court's partial summary judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
29. Thereafter, the district court conducted a trial in which it determined the fair 
market value of the trust properties at the time of the foreclosures sales. On September 11, 
2013, the district court signed and entered its judgment against Robertson. A copy of the 
district court's judgment is attached as Addendum Tab B. 
30. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment Robertson's counsel, 
Thomas E. Anthony, stated that Robertson had mailed by regular mail a request for a payoff 
statement. (R.001361) 
31. Robertson's payoff statement was not sent by an approved delivery method 
required by Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-31.S(l)(a), and was never received by the Trustee. 
(R.000500-000497). 
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32. Robertson entered into a written ACH Origination Agreement with the Bank 
on October 14, 2008 (the "ACH Agreement").2 (R.000336-000334) 
33. The ACH Agreement provided that it could be terminated mutually 
terminated by written notice by either party. (R.000335) A copy of the ACH Agreement is 
attached hereto as Addendum Tab C. The ACH Agreement provided that "[t]his 
Agreement may be terminated on a ten days written notice by either party, provided that 
applicable portions of this Agreement should remain in effect with respect to any entries 
initiated by the company prior to such termination." (Id.) 
34. In a letter dated September 22, 2010, the Bank's Vice President Jeffrey 
Rounds sent a letter to Mike Robertson giving notice of termination of the ACH Agreement. 
(R.000332) A copy of the letter is attached as Addendum Tab D. The letter stated the 
effective termination date was October 13, 2010. (Id.) 
35. On October 12, 2010, Far West, by letter from Jeffrey Rounds, notified 
Robertson that the effective date of the termination of the ACH Agreement would be 
October 21, 2010. (R.000330). A copy of the letter is attached as Addendum Tab E. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Robertson defaulted on the consolidated 2009 Note which was secured by 
the Trust Deeds. Notices of Default were duly recorded and served upon Robertson. 
Robertson failed to cure the defaults and the trust properties were properly posted, 
published and noticed for sale and sold at the foreclosure sales. The fair market value of 
2 ACH payments are electronic payments that occur when a customer gives a bank or 
other person authorization to debit funds directly from the customer's checking or saving 
account for the purpose of making a payment. 
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the trust properties was less than the balance owing on the 2009 Note. The district court 
determined the fair market value of the trust property and entered a money judgment for 
the deficiency pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (Tab B). 
2. On October 14, 2008, the Bank and Robertson entered into the ACH 
Agreement. (R000336) (Tab C). The ACH Agreement provided for an ACH credit limit 
of$150,000 comprised of a $75,000 ACH credit limit and a $75,000 ACH debit limit. 
{Id.) The ACH Agreement provided that it could be terminated by either Robertson or 
the Bank on ten ( 10) days written notice. The district court interpreted the Agreement 
properly and concluded that the Bank had a right to terminate the Agr_eement. The notice 
gave Robertson until October 13, 2010 until the Agreement terminated. Thereafter, the 
Bank extended the effective termination date to October 21, 2010. Robertson was given 
twenty (20) days' notice of termination. The district court found that the Bank properly 
terminated the ACH Agreement according to its terms. 
3. The e-mail from the Bank's officer, Dan Brian to Robertson in April 2009 
(the "Brian e-mail") was not part of the Loan Agreement and did not alter the terms of 
the ACH Agreement. Brian's e-mail only stated that the Bank would "reinstate" the 
ACH Agreement. The Bank reinstated the ACH Agreement in early 2009. 
4. The district court's legal conclusion that the ACH Agreement was separate 
and apart from the 2009 Loan Documents was based on uncontroverted facts and the 
unambiguous loan documents. The 2009 Note was a consolidated note of the 2006 Note 
and the 2007 Note in the amount of $669,726.32 which was secured by the Trust Deeds. 
By contrast the 2008 ACH Agreement was an unsecured ACH line of credit in the 
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amount of $150,000. The ACH Agreement was not mentioned or in any way integrated 
into the 2009 Loan Documents. 
5. The ACH Agreement provided that Robertson or the Bank could terminate 
the ACH Agreement provided that any applicable portions of the Agreement would 
remain in effect with respect to any entries initiated by Robertson prior to termination. 
6. There was no modification of the ACH Agreement to extend its terms. 
Robertson's argument that the term of the ACH Agreement was the same as the five year 
term of 2009 Note is unfounded. The 2006 Note and the 2007 Note, which were 
consolidated in the 2009 Note, existed before the October 14, 2008 ACH Agreement was 
executed. Robertson raises this argument for the first time on appeal. There is no 
evidence of any such a term in the ACH Agreement, in the 2009 Loan Documents or in 
the Brian e-mail. 
7. The district court correctly ruled that the Bank did not breach an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by exercising an express term that permitted 
either Robertson or the Bank to terminate the Agreement. The district court also rejected 
Robertson's legal argument that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
should be treated as a tort-type claim. 
8. Robertson defaulted on the 2009 Note by failing to make the required 
payments thereunder. Robertson admitted to the district court that he was in default of 
the 2009 Note and Loan Agreement and that he failed to make payments due thereunder. 
Robertson's argument that he did not default on the payment is contrary to the evidence. 
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9. The trustee conducting the foreclosures sales for the benefit of the Bank 
gave proper notice of the foreclosure sales by having the notices personally served, 
published and posted on the trust properties. The notices contained the metes and bounds 
descriptions of the trust properties as specifically described in the trust deeds. 
10. The Bank complied with the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-31.5. 
The Trustee never received a request for a payoff statement from Robertson, and the 
Trustee's sworn affidavit that he did not receive any such request was uncontroverted. 
Robertson also admitted that he did not serve his request through one of the approved 
delivery methods provided by the statute. 
11. The Trustee complied with Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 in conducting the 
foreclosure sales. The Notices of Sale contained the precise legal descriptions contained 
in the original Trust Deeds executed by Robertson as general partner for Round Peak 
Natural Seed Farm, Ltd. 
12. The district court properly denied Robertson's motion for summary 
judgment on his alleged breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Robertson's counterclaim that an implied covenant under the ACH Agreement was a tort-
type claim rather than a contract claim is contrary to Utah law. The district court also 
accurately concluded that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could not 
contradict unambiguous terms of the ACH Agreement. 
13. The district court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the testimony 
of an appraiser Robertson sought to call during trial. The testimony was properly . 
excluded because: (a) the appraiser and her opinions were not disclosed under Rule 26; 
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(b) the appraiser and her opinions were not disclosed in compliance with the district 
court's final pretrial order; ( c) the appraiser and her opinions were not disclosed within 
(60) days of receiving the Bank's expert disclosures and expert report; (d) the appraiser 
and her opinions were not disclosed at the commencement of trial; ( e) the appraiser and 
her opinions were not disclosed before the district court excused the Bank's expert 
witness who would have given rebuttal testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE 2006 AND 2007 NOTES WERE CONSOLIDATED INTO THE 2009 
NOTE AND 2009 LOAN AGREEMENT. 
Robertson borrowed money from the Bank under two separate loan transactions 
made in 2006 and 2007. The loans were secured by the Trust Deeds conveyed by Round 
Peak Natural Seed Farms, Ltd. The 2006 Note and 2007 Note were consolidated into the 
2009 Note which remained secured by the Trust Deeds. The 2009 Loan Agreement was 
executed with the 2009 Note. The 2009 Note stated: 
COLLATERAL. Borrower acknowledges this Note is secured by the following 
collateral described in the security instruments listed herein: 
(A) a Revolving Credit Deed of Trust dated SEPTEMBER 12, 2007, to a trustee in 
favor of Lender on real property described as "Real Property located at NNA, ~ 
SPRINGVILLE, UT 84663" and located in UTAH County, State of Utah; 
(B) a Revolving Credit Deed of Trust dated AUGUST 21, 2006, to a trustee in 
favor of Lender on real property described as "Real Property located at NNA, 
SPRINGVILLE, UT 84663" and located in UTAH County, State of Utah. ~ 
(R.000038.) 
The 2009 Note and corresponding Loan Agreement were integrated documents. 
FINAL AGREEMENT. Borrower understands that this agreement 
and the related loan documents are the final expression of the 
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agreement between lender and borrower and may not be contradicted 
by. evidence of any alleged oral agreement. (R.000393). 
Robertson defaulted under the 2009 Note and 2009 Loan Agreement, and the 
foregoing described Trust Deeds were lawfully foreclosed. After the foreclosures were 
completed, a deficiency action was commenced against Robertson. Thereafter, the 
district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Bank's deficiency claims 
(Tab A) and then conducted a trial where the court determined the fair market value of 
the trust properties. The district court entered its deficiency judgment against Robertson 
on September 11, 2013. 
II. THE 2008 ACH AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN THE BANK AND 
ROBERTSON WAS SUBJECT TO TERMINATION BY ROBERTSON OR 
THE BANK UPON TEN DAYS WRITTEN NOTICE. 
Robertson contends that an e-mail from Dan Brian to Robertson (i.e., the Brian e-
mail) somehow created a separate agreement or caused the ACH Agreement to become 
integrated with the 2009 Note and Loan Agreement. The Bank disagrees. There is no 
support for this argument in the Loan Documents, the ACH Agreement or the Brian 
email. The Brian e-mail merely read: "Mike, upon completion of the new loan 
documentation, we will reinstate your ACH line. Thanks, Dan Brian." (R.000297.) 
The Bank and Robertson agreed to consolidate the 2006 Note and the 2007 Note 
into the 2009 Note and Loan Agreement and that the 2009 Note and Loan Agreement 
would remain secured by the 2006 Trust Deed and the 2007 Trust Deed. The 2009 Loan 
Documents did not address or attempt to modify the 2008 ACH Agreement. Moreover, 
the Loan Documents could not be modified by parole evidence. 
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Similarly, the ACH Agreement contained no reference to the 2006 Note, the 2006 
Trust Deed, the 2007 Note, or the 2007 Trust Deed which preceded the 2009 Note and 
2009 Loan Agreement. As such, the district court correctly determined that Robertson 
did not have a breach of contract claim stating in part: 
9. Defendant Robertson does not have a claim for breach of contract arising from 
the foreclosure of the Trust Deeds, the cancellation of the ACH Agreement or any 
other loan document or Agreement. The ACH Agreement unequivocally provided 
that either party could cancel the agreement within ten ( 10) days' notice. The 
facts are undisputed that Far West gave more than twenty (20) days' notice of 
cancellation of the ACH Agreement to Defendant Robertson and therefore Far 
West fully complied with the termination terms of the ACH Agreement. 
10. Because the Far West Trust Deeds were foreclosed in compliance with their 
terms and applicable Utah law and because Far West tenninated the ACH 
Agreement pursuant to its terms, Far West did not breach any implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in connection with any of the foregoing documents or 
agreements. (R.000687-000686) 
On September 22, 2010, approximately a year and a half after the Bank's 
reinstatement of the ACH Agreement, the Bank sent a letter to Robertson giving him 
written notice of termination of the ACH Agreement to be effective on October 13, 2010. 
(R.000531 ). On October 12, 2010, the Bank wrote a second letter extending the effective 
date of termination to October 21, 2010. Thus, Robertson was given more than 20 days' 
notice of termination. (R.000330)("[The] Bank has elected to extend the cancellation 
dated to October 21 st to allow [Robertson] additional time to make alternate ACH 
arrangements.") 
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A. The E-mail from Dan Brian was as a Matter of Law Not Part of 
the Loan Agreement or the Separate ACH Agreement, and it 
Did Not Alter the Terms of the Written, Executed ACH 
Agreement. 
Dan Brian, on behalf of the Bank, e-mailed Robertson that the Bank would 
reinstate the written ACH Agreement: "04/30/09 ... [W]e will reinstate your ACH line." 
(R.000584). Accordingly, in 2009 the Bank reinstated the ACH Agreement. The Brian e-
mail said nothing about changing the terms of the ACH Agreement. It said the Bank will 
reinstate the ACH Agreement. 
The ACH Agreement allowed the Bank to reassess its risk as an unsecured 
creditor and to terminate the credit arrangement upon ten days' notice. The ACH 
Agreement did not require a default in payment. Rather, either party could terminate 
based on a party's sole and exclusive discretion.3 
In 2010 the Bank decided not to continue the ACH Agreement and complied with 
the terms of the ACH Agreement when it gave Robertson more than 20 days' notice of 
termination. 
On appeal, for the first time, Robertson argues that the ACH Agreement had the 
same term of the 2009 Note (which was five years). Applt. 38. ("Was to run at least as 
long as the new note"). Aplt. Brief at 38. The new argument is baseless. There is 
nothing in the ACH Agreement which provided for a five year term. The Brian e-mail 
3 The ACH Agreement was a commercial transaction between two businesses in 
commerce not a consumer transaction. Even Robertson's business transactions were 
business transactions. R.000554)("All Transactions were Business to Business 
transactions") 
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did not say the ACH Agreement would continue in perpetuity or even for the term of the 
2009 Note as Robertson contends on appeal.4 
B. The District Court Did not Err in Interpreting the Loan Documents. 
The district court applied the proper tools of contract construction in determining 
that the ACH Agreement was separate from the 2009 Note and Loan Agreement and 
could be enforced pursuant to its own terms. The district court recognized that the 2009 
Note and Loan Agreement had integration clauses. The 2009 Note provides that ''NOTICE 
OF FINAL AGREEMENT. THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND CONTAINED IN THE LOAN 
DOCUMENTS IS A FINAL EXPRESSION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BORROWER AND 
LENDER AND MAY NOT BE CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE OF ANY ALLEGED ORAL 
AGREEMENT." (R000038) Similarly, the 2009 Loan Agreement provides "FINAL 
AGREEMENT. Borrower understands that the loan documents signed in connection with 
this loan are the final expression of the Agreement between Lender and Borrower and 
may not be contradicted by evidence of any alleged oral agreement." (R.000030) Again, 
the 2009 Loan Documents do not mention or incorporate the ACH Agreement and the 
ACH Agreement does not reference or incorporate any of loan documents that existed in 
2008 when the ACH Agreement was signed. 
Robertson cites to Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266,267 (Utah 1972) 
for the proposition that the separate agreements were somehow interwoven. The Bank 
disagrees. In Bullfrog the Supreme Court indicated that "where two or more instruments 
4 Even assuming arguendo that the Brian email constituted a binding agreement, 
the agreement was that the ACH Agreement would be reinstated not that it would have a 
five year term. 
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are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the course of 
the same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will be read and 
construed together .... " Here, Robertson borrowed money from the Bank on two 
separate secured loan transactions in 2006 and 2007. The ACH Agreement was made on 
October 14, 2008. The 2006 and 2007 Notes on the secured transaction were 
consolidated into the 2009 Note (R.000039-000036) and corresponding Loan Agreement. 
(R.000035-000030) 
Had the documents been integrated, the 2009 Note and Loan Agreement would 
have so stated and the 2008 ACH Agreement would have been amended to reflect any 
necessary changes. Even assuming arguendo that they were somehow integrated, the 
integration of the separate documents would not change the clear and unambiguous terms 
of those documents. Thus, the secured 2009 Note would have a five year term and the 
ACH unsecured line of credit would be subject to termination upon 10 days' notice by 
either party. Robertson mistakenly believes that by somehow showing that the 
documents were integrated that their respective terms would change. This assumption is 
misplaced. The district court would still interpret the documents according to their 
unambiguous terms. Thus, Robertson's integration argument would not change the 
district court's ruling: 
C. The ACH Agreement Provided that Both Parties, the Bank and 
Robertson, Could Terminate the Agreement on Ten Days' Written 
Notice. 
Robertson's reliance on Aquagen International v. Cabrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411 
(Utah 1998) is misplaced. In that case the Supreme Court reversed the district court's 
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decision which sought to enforce contract terms despite the other parties failure to 
perform and that the contract was unenforceable for failure of consideration. It has no 
application to the issues on appeal. Robertson's reliance on Pierce v. Pierce, 2000 UT, 
119,994 P.2d 1930 is also inapplicable. The case addressed a wife's right to enforce a 
post-nuptial agreement prior to her husband's death in seeking a constructive trust on 
assets transferred by the husband prior to his death. 
D. There Was No Amendment or Modification of the Terms of the ACH 
Agreement. 
The ACH Agreement sets forth a description of the specific operations which 
permitted Robertson to initiate electronic signals for paperless entries through the Bank to 
accounts maintained at the Bank and other financial institutions by means of the 
automated clearing house operated by Northwest Clearing House Association. The ACH 
Agreement sets forth the specific terms of how the clearing house process would operate 
and specific requirements of performance. The ACH Agreement, paragraph 14, 
specifically addressed that upon termination pending transactions would be cleared as 
follows. "This Agreement may be terminated on a ten days written notice by either party, 
provided that applicable portions of this agreement shall remain in effect with respect to 
any entries initiated by the company (i.e., Robertson) prior to such termination." 
(R.000335)(Tab C). No amendment was ever made to the ACH Agreement, paragraph 
14 or any other term. Had an amendment been made, it would have addressed the terms 
of the ACH Agreement to be changed and would have addressed how pending 
transactions would be handled upon termination. Robertson bore the burden of proving 
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() 
that an amendment was made and that such amendment changed paragraph 14. 
However, he provided no such evidence to the district court. Rather, Robertson 
illogically argues that the ACH Agreement was implicitly amended because the original 
2006 and 2007 Notes, which were secured by real estate, were consolidated into the 2009 
Note. Despite however many times he makes the argument, it is unsupported by the 
documents. Moreover, the course of performance between the parties was to document 
any material changes. Thus, when the 2006 Note and the 2007 Note were changed, a 
new consolidated 2009 Note and Loan Agreement were made. Similarly, had the parties 
decided to change a material term of the ACH Agreement, a superseding document 
would have been executed. Changing an unsecured ACH line of credit from a risk period 
often days to five years would have been a material change that would have been 
formally documented.5 
III. ROBERTSON WAS IN DEFAULT UNDER THE TRUST DEEDS AND 
THE FORECLOSURE WAS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO UT AH LAW. 
A. The 2009 Note Was In Default. 
The facts were undisputed that Robertson was in default of the 2009 Note. He 
admitted that he ceased making payments under the Loan Agreement. Robertson Deel. 
,JSO. (R.000546). Robertson also admitted in his answer to the Bank's Interrogatory No. 
4 that he failed to make payments on the loan owing to the Bank. (R.000656). 
5 For example, if the percentage of default transactions, credit or debit, began to fail, the 
Bank could give ten days' notice of the termination to avoid the possibility of having the 
outstanding credit transactions exceed the line of credit. Conversely, if the term of the 
ACH were for five years without a prior right of termination, the Bank would not have 
the ability to protect itself by terminating the Agreement under multiple breaches or 
Robertson's insolvency. · · 
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He failed to cure those defaults. (R.000462) (uncontroverted facts 13, 14 and 15 
of the Bank's memorandum in support of summary judgment) Based on the foregoing, 
the district court ruled: 
9. Certain events of default occurred including that Robertson failed to make timely fi:> 
payments under the 2009 Note. As a result, Notices of Default were recorded on 
January 13, 2011 as Entries 4120:2011 and 4122:2011 with the Utah County 
recorder's office. The Notices of Default were duly served upon Robertson as the 
borrower and upon Round Peak Partnership as the trustor under the 2006 Trust Deed 
and the 2007 Trust Deed. OOJ 
10. Defendant Robertson failed to cure the default during the statutory period 
required by Utah law and the Trust Property was noticed for sale through the 
substituted trustee's notices (the "Trustee's") of Trustee's Sale. The Notices of 
Trustee's Sale were duly served on Robertson and Round Peak Partnership and were ~ 
published and posted as required by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-25 and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-26. (R. 001099)(Tab B) 
Robertson has marshalled no evidence to show that the foregoing findings are clearly 
erroneous or that the conclusions of law are incorrect. 
B. The Notices of Default and Notices of Sale Were Properly Given. 
Robertson admitted that the Notices of Default and Notices of Sale were properly 
given. Accordingly, the district court concluded that "[t]he facts are undisputed and 
Defendant Robertson admitted at hearing that the Notices of Default and Notices of 
Trustees' Sales were properly served upon and received by Defendant Robertson. There 
was more than sufficient debt owing to Far West for the foreclosure of the Trust Deeds." 
(R.000687)(Tab A) Robertson has presented no evidence to establish that the foregoing 
findings are clearly erroneous or that the conclusions of law are incorrect. 
C. The Bank Properly Noticed the Trust Properties for Sale by Using the 
Legal Descriptions of those Properties. 
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Robertson executed the 2006 Trust Deed to secure the 2006 Note and the 2007 
Trust Deed to secure the 2007 Note. The Notes were later consolidated into the 2009 
Note. As stated therein the 2009 Note was secured by both Trust Deeds. The Trust 
Deeds included metes and bounds descriptions of the trust properties. (R.000067-
000059; R.000049-000039) The Notices of Default (R.000022-000021; 000019-000018) 
and the Notices of Sale contained those precise legal descriptions. (R.000016-000014-
000013; R.000010-000009). 
Concerning notices of default, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-24( 1) provides that such a 
notice should provide "a legal description of the trust property". Concerning notices of 
sale, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-25(1) require that "[t]he trustee shall give written notice of 
the time and place of the sale particularly describing the property to be sold;" Id. (italics 
added). There is nothing in either statute that requires that the tax parcel identification 
numbers be given. Accordingly, the district court found and concluded that: 
4. The legal descriptions included in the Trust Deeds, the Notices of 
Default, the Notices of Sale and Trustee's Deeds were lawful because they 
contained the metes and bounds descriptions of the trust properties 
conveyed to secure the loan owing to Far West. A tax parcel identification 
number, which may be assigned to a prope11y by a county recorder or a 
county assessor does not constitute a legal description of property under the 
Utah foreclosure statutes. (R.000688) 
Robertson's insistence that the legal descriptions given were insufficient because 
they did not contain property tax parcels numbers is contrary to the applicable statute. 
Thus, Robertson has not established that the district court's conclusion is incorrect. 
D. Robertson Failed to Send a Lawful Request for a Payoff Statement. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-31.5(2)(a)(ii)(B) provides that an interested party may 
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request a payoff statement from the trustee. "A request for a payoff statement is not 
timely unless the trustee receives the request at least 10 business days before the trustee's 
sale." Id. Here, the Trustee's Notices of Sales were schedule for June 1, 2011. Thus, 
given the exclusions of weekends Robertson's request for a payoff statement had to be 
received by the Trustee by Wednesday May 18, 2011. While Robertson asserted at the 
hearing on partial summary judgment that he mailed a request for payoff on May 16, 
2011, the Trustee never received a payoff request from Robertson at any time prior to the 
foreclosure sales. The Trustee testified in his Affidavit as follows: 
20. Robertson has asserted that on or about May 16, 2011 he mailed to me a 
request for a pay-off statement via priority mail. 
21. However, at no time did I ever receive any such written request from 
Robertson via priority mail or by any other written means. 
22. At no time did I ever receive a certified mailing return receipt requested from 
Mike Robertson in which he requested a payoff statement prior to the foreclosure 
sale. 
23. At no time has Robertson provided me with any certified mailing which I 
signed or refused to sign. (R.000497). 
The Trustee's sworn testimony was never controverted and Robertson never submitted 
any evidence that the Trustee ever received his request. In enacting the foregoing section 
the Utah legislature surely contemplated possible disputes concerning the receipt of a 
mailing. As such, the statute requires that a request for payoff be made through an 
"approved delivery method". An "approved delivery method" is one sent by certified or 
registered mail with return receipt requested or by a nationally recognized letter or 
package delivery or carrier service operating in the state that provides a service for 
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tracking the delivery of an item; or documentation that the item was received by the 
intended recipient; or that the person refused to accept delivery. Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-
31.5(1)(a). 
Robertson's counsel, Thomas E. Anthony, stated at the hearing on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Robertson's Counterclaim, that Robertson "mailed it 
on the 16th with the United States Post Office in priority mail." Transcript of Hearing, 
March 21, 2013, p. 32, lines 11-12. (R.001361). Based upon his admission that the 
request was not sent by an "approved delivery method" he failed to comply with the 
statute by his own admission. Thus, Robertson failed to present any evidence that the 
request was received by the Trustee to lawfully controvert the Trustee's affidavit which 
became an uncontroverted fact for purposes of summary judgment. See Portfolio 
Recovery Associates, LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App. 255, ,IIO, 314 P.3d 1069 ("Where 
the nonmoving party fails to file responsive affidavits or other evidentiary material 
allowed by rule 56( e ), we accept as undisputed the facts presented by the movant. Scott v. 
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, il 17, 980 P.2d 214.") The district court, after reviewing the 
uncontroverted facts, found there was no evidence that the Trustee had received a payoff 
statement. 
E. The Trustee Complied with Section 57-1-27 in Conducting the Trust 
Deed Sales. 
Robertson's claim that he did not know the accurate legal descriptions of the trust 
properties conveyed under the Trust Deeds being foreclosed is unfounded. Robertson 
executed each of the Trust Deeds as a general partner of Round Peak Natural Seed Farms, 
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Ltd. (R.000061-000060; R.000041). By executing the Trust Deeds he surely knew of the 
trust properties conveyed. Robertson was also served with and received Notices of Default 
under the Trust Deeds. (R.000023-000018) He was also served with the Notices of the 
Trustee's Sales. The Notices of Default (R.000022-000021; 000019-000018) and the 
Notices of Sale contained the precise legal descriptions of the trust properties (R.000016-
000014-000013; R.000010-000009) to be foreclosed and precise references to both Trust 
Deeds. (Id.) Robertson's assertion that he was not certain about what was being sold 
would have occurred only ifhe failed to read the Notices of Default and the Notices of 
Sale. Even if Robertson had a mistaken belief that only one parcel was going to be sold, 
the lawfulness of the Notices of Sale served upon Robertson, rather than his state of 
mind, govern. Those Notices clearly show that all the trust properties were being sold. 
IV. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The District Court Properly Dismissed Robertson' Breach of Contract 
Claim. 
The district court found that Robertson did not have a claim for breach of contract 
arising from the foreclosure of the Trust Deeds, the cancellation of the ACH Agreement 
or any other loan document or agreement. (R.000687.) There is nothing in the Brian e-
mail that contradicts the express, unambiguous, written terms of the ACH Agreement. 
Paragraph 14 provided that either party could terminate the ACH Agreement upon ten 
days' written notice. (R.000336-000334) (Tab C) Again, Robertson's reliance on the 
Brian e-mail to support a breach of contract claim is misplaced. There is nothing in that 
e-mail that amended or modified the unambiguous terms and conditions of the ACH 
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Agreement. 
Robertson again argues that the Brian e-mail was a contract where Robertson 
agreed to sign the documents for the Loan Agreement and the Bank agreed to reinstate 
the written ACH Agreement. The e-mail was merely a reminder that Robertson would 
not have his property foreclosed under the Loan Agreement if he brought his default 
current. It also stated that the Bank would reinstate the separate, unsecured written ACH 
Agreement. The Bank did that. Even assuming arguendo that the Brian e-mail was a 
contract, the Bank reinstated the ACH Agreement. The Brian e-mail provides no basis 
for a claim that the unsecured ACH Agreement would be amended to endure for the five 
year term of the 2009 Note. It is incredulous for Robertson to argue without any written 
evidence of modification to the ACH Agreement that the unambiguous terms of the ACH 
Agreement were somehow modified. The district court did not err in interpreting the 
ACH Agreement and concluding as follows: 
9. Defendant Robertson does not have a claim for breach of contract arising 
from the foreclosure of the Trust Deeds, the cancellation of the ACH Agreement 
or any other loan document or Agreement. The ACH Agreement unequivocally 
provided that either party could cancel the agreement within ten ( 10) days' notice. 
The facts are undisputed that Far West gave more than twenty (20) days' notice of 
cancellation of the ACH Agreement to Defendant Robertson and therefore Far 
West fully complied with the termination terms of the ACH Agreement. 
(R.000587) 
B. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Robertson's Claim Based Upon 
The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing. 
In his counterclaim Robertson alleged that the agreement contained an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing that the parties would deal with each other in 
good faith and the Bank breached that covenant by foreclosing the trust deeds that 
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secured the 2009 Note and Loan Agreement. (R.000087) 
The district court disagreed and applied this Court's precedence that "[t]here is no 
violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, as a matter of law, when a party is 
simply exercising its contractual rights." PDQ Lube Center, Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792, 
798 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 163 
(Utah App. 1992) ( emphasis added). "[The covenant of good faith and fair dealing] 
cannot be read to establish new independent rights or duties to which the parties did not 
agree ex ante . . . . Second this covenant cannot create rights and duties inconsistent with 
express contractual terms." Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226, 
1240 (Utah 2004 ). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing "cannot be construed to 
establish new independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." Id. at 798 
(citing Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). 
After reviewing and considering the specific terms of the 2009 Loan Documents 
and the ACH Agreement, the district court determined that the Bank's actions were in 
compliance with the ACH Agreement and 2009 Loan Documents: 
Because the Far West Trust Deeds were foreclosed in compliance with 
their terms and applicable Utah law and because Far West terminated 
the ACH Agreement pursuant to its terms, Far West did not breach any 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in connection with any 
of the foregoing documents or agreements." 
(R.000686)(Tab A). 
In an effort to circumvent the opinions of this Court and the Supreme Court, that 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an implied contract covenant, 
Robertson, through his counsel who previously practiced in California, argued that the 
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district court should treat the alleged breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as a tort-type claim rather than a contract claim. The district court acknowledged 
that California case law treats it as a tort but that Utah law does not. The district court 
refused to allow the legal doctrine to be used to contradict express terms of the parties' 
agreements: 
The Court also rejects Robertson's argument that the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing may be treated as a tort-type claim or-that an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may contradict specific 
written terms of an agreement. 
(R. 000686) (Tab A) 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Robertson's Claim for Negligence. 
The economic loss doctrine is a basis for dismissing Robertson's claim for 
negligence. It is well-settled under Utah law that a plaintiff may not recover "economic" 
losses under a non-intentional tort theory. See Am.Towers Owners' Ass 'n. v. CCI Mech., 
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996); Maackv. Resource Design & Cosntr., Inc., 875 
P.2d 570, 579-80 (Utah Ct. app. 1984). The economic loss doctrine bars tort claims when 
the conflict arises out of a contract, unless there is an independent, non-contractual duty. 
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P3d 1, (Utah 2003) ("[W]hen parties' difficulties arise 
directly from a contractual relationship, the resulting litigation concerning those difficulties 
is one in contract no matter what words the plaintiff may wish to use in describing it.") 
(quoting Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1088 (Wyo. 1999)); see also Hermansen v. 
Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002). The doctrine applies to all negligence based claims, 
including a claim for negligent misrepresentation. See SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 
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Ventulett, Stainback & Assoc., Inc., 28 P.3d 669,683 (Utah 2001) (holding that claims for 
negligent misrepresentation are barred under the economic loss doctrine because, otherwise, 
"parties could essentially sidestep contractual duties by bringing a cause of action in tort to 
recover the very benefits they were unable to obtain in contractual negotiations"); see also 
Hafen v. Strebeck, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (D. Utah 2004) (barring negligent 
misrepresentation claim based on economic loss doctrine). 
In this case, the relationship between Robertson and the Bank was clearly one based 
in contract. Robertson was a party to the Notes and the Loan Agreements and the Bank was 
the lender. Nevertheless, Robertson claims that the Bank negligently administered his 
contracts with the Bank. Robertson alleged that the Bank failed to notice, advertise for sale 
and sell all of trust properties conveyed as collateral. Robertson cannot seek damages for an 
alleged breach of the 2009 Loan Documents and also sue the Bank for allegedly negligently 
performing or administering those contracts. At the hearing before the district court 
Robertson (through his counsel) recognized the economic loss doctrine and stipulated to the 
dismissal of the negligence claim. Accordingly, the district court in its summary judgment 
ruled as follows: 
8. The counterclaim in negligence against Far West should be dismissed 
because it is barred by the economic loss doctrine as that doctrine has been 
applied by the Utah courts. In addition, Robertson stipulated at hearing that 
the negligence claim against Far West could be dismissed with prejudice. 
(R.000687) 
Robertson has failed to establish any error in the district court's summary judgment. 
D. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Robertson's Cla_im for Unjust 
Enrichment. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the doctrine of unjust enrichment or 
quantum meruit does not apply when there was an express or implied contract covering the 
subject of the litigation. See Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461,465 
(Utah 1978) ("Recovery in quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract 
covering the subject matter of this litigation"); Davies v. Olson, 746 p.2d 264, 268 (Utah 
App. 1987) ("Recovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or 
oral contract exists."); see also Concrete Products Co. y. Salt Lake County, 734 P.2d 910, 
911 (Utah 1987). 
The facts are undisputed in this case that there were written agreements between 
Robertson and the Bank governing the matters in dispute. Robertson alleges in his 
counterclaim that the Bank breached those agreements by recording a "trustee's deed in 
favor of Far West Bank on four parcels of property when they only sold one." (R.000086) 
The terms of the 2009 Loan Documents governed the Bank's remedies if Robertson 
defaulted on the Note, and how the foreclosure sales of the trust properties would be 
conducted. Accordingly, the district court ruled that: 
12. Utah law bars a claim for unjust enrichment when there are written 
agreements governing the subject matter upon which the unjust enrichment claim 
is based. The facts are undisputed that there were written loan agreements made 
between Far West and Defendant Robertson concerning the subject matter of 
Defendant Robertson's unjust enrichment claim. Therefore, Defendant 
Robertson's claim for unjust enrichment should be dismissed with prejudice. 
(R.000686) (Tab A) 
In sum, the district court correctly dismissed Robertson's four counterclaims based 
upon the uncontroverted facts and applicable law. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
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EXCLUDING ROBERTSON'S UNDISCLOSED EXPERT WITNESS. 
The district court properly excluded Robert's undisputed expert witness for 
numerous reasons. First, Robertson failed to disclose the witness in compliance with 
Rule 26 which governed at time. 
Second, Robertson failed to disclose his expert appraiser and her report in his 
initial disclosures and he never supplemented those disclosures. He violated Rule 
26(a)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 
Third, Robertson violated the district court's instructions given to the parties at the 
final pretrial conference that all documents had to be disclosed prior to trial. The court 
warned Robertson early on that ifhe did not disclose documents, the court would not 
admit them into evidence. "The Court: - - to set, just so you both know ... If you don't 
disclose documents, I don't let them into evidence ... " Pre-Trial Conference transcript 
p.5, lines 12-15. February 29, 2012 (R.001360). 
Fourth, Robertson also violated Rule 26(a)(4)(C)(ii) which provided that "[t]he 
party who does not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is 
offered shall serve on the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)( 4)(A) 
6 
"A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties the 
following information regarding any person who may be used at trial to present evidence 
under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and who is retained or specially employed 
to provide expert testimony in the case ... : (i) the expert's name and qualifications ... 
and a list of any other cases in which the expert has testified as an expert at trial or by 
deposition within the preceding four years, (ii) a brief summary of the opinions to which 
the witness is expected to testify, (iii) all data and other information that will be relied 
upon by the witness in forming those opinions, and (iv) the compensation to be paid for 
the witness's study and testimony." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(A) (2013). 
36 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
within seven days after the later of (A) the date on which the elective under paragraph 
(a)(4)(C)(i) is due, or (B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the expert's 
deposition .... " 
Fourth, Robertson failed to disclose or even mention the expert witness at the 
commencement of trial. 
Mr. Call: 
Court: 
Your - your honor, he hasn't even provided us with a copy of 
that document. 
Oh. Do you have an extra copy for them? But I - - I'll just 
state that all of these rules, to the Court's mind, were put in 
place for one purpose - well, the main purpose being to avoid 
at the end of the day what was colloquially referred to as trial 
by ambush and that's when we show up at trial and things 
start coming out that nobody knows anything about. Even if, 
for the sake of argument, the first time you had seen their 
appraisal had been 3 0 days ago and then you wanted to do a 
response two weeks later and even if you had only got the 
report four days ago, at a minimum, it should have been given 
to the Plaintiff at that time. And let's say you didn't even 
have it til last night, it should have been handed to them 
before we started the trial, but - but to get in the middle of a 
trial and start wanting to put on non-disclosed evidence or 
witnesses is just not how we proceed . . . . That just turns 
into a situation that's just patently unfair and so I'm not going 
to ... allow it. Trial Transcript p. 143, lines 17 -25 through 
p. 144 lines, 1-13. (R.001362). 
Fifth, Robertson withheld the identity of his expert witness and her appraisal until 
after the Bank had rested its case and the Bank's expert appraiser had been excused by 
the court with Robertson stating he had no reason for the Bank's expert to remain in the 
courthouse. "Mr. Dibble: Your Honor, may Mr. Reeves be excused? The Court: Any 
reason for him to remain, Mr. Robertson? Mr. Robertson: No, your Honor. The Court: 
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Okay. He may be released." Trial Transcript, p. 105, lines 8-12. (R.1362).7 
Sixth, Robertson's witness was a rebuttal witness who needed to be disclosed. 
Robertson told the court that the expert was a "rebuttal" witness. "Robertson: I would 
like to your Honor. Can I call a witness in rebuttal ofthe-the-the plaintifrs expert 
witness? .... The Court: And who's that? Robertson: Sue Kimball. The Court: Has 
that been disclosed? Mr. Robertson: Has not. The Court: Okay. I'm not going to allow 
you to call any expert witness whose report hasn't been provided to the plaintiff. Mr. 
Robertson: Okay." Trial Transcript pp. 116-17, lines 24-25 and 1-11. (R.1362), 
Finally, it would have been prejudicial to the Bank had Robertson been able to 
present an undisclosed expert witness with undisclosed opinions with an undisclosed 
appraisal report. The Bank's counsel would have had no opportunity to review her 
opinions with the Bank's expert, to investigate the appraiser or to prepare for cross 
examination. 
Based upon the foregoing, the district court's judgment provided as follows: "The 
Court refused to permit an expert witness to appear and testify for Robertson because the 
expert witness had never been identified or disclosed until the witness was called to 
testify at trial." (R.001096) (Tab B) The district court's determination of inadmissibility 
was not an abuse of discretion. 
7 Robertson's reliance on Glacier Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe Assoc., 2006 UT App. 516, 
154 P .3d 852 is misplaced. In that case the trial court exercised its discretion and allowed 
a non-disclosed witness to be used to impeach a single statement made by Klawe. Here, 
• 
Robertson sought to call an undisclosed appraiser to testify as to the fair market value of e 
trust properties which was the primary issue at trial. 
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VI. THE BANK IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The Bank is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees on appeal pursuant 
to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The 2009 Note contains a covenant for the award of 
attorneys' fees including attorneys' fees incurred on appeal. (R.000432). The Trust 
Deeds also contain covenants for an award of attorneys' fees regarding appeals. 
(R.000426). The award of reasonable attorneys' fees in favor of the Bank is also 
supported by Utah Code Ann§ 57-1-32 which provides that "[i]n any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable 
attorney fees incurred." Id. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court, after showing great patience carefully examined the 
uncontroverted material facts and correctly applied the law. The district court correctly 
dismissed Robertson's four counterclaims for relief and correctly granted the Bank's 
motion for partial summary judgment. As such, the district court's summary judgment 
against Robertson's counterclaim and partial summary judgment in favor of the Bank 
should be affirmed. The Court also made accurate findings of fact based upon the oral 
and documentary evidence presented at trial. Based upon those findings of fact, the 
district court made its conclusions of law and judgment against Robertson. The district 
court also properly considered and denied Robertson's motion for a new trial. As such, 
the district court's Judgment against Robertson should be affirmed, and the Bank should 
be awarded is reasonable attorneys' fees incurred on appeal. 
DATED this 5th day of July, 2016. 
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f.·:-: 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FAR WEST BANK, a division of 
American West Bank, a Washington 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, 
vs. 
MIKEL. ROBERTSON, an individual 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. 




PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
INFAVOROFFARWEST BANK 
Civil No. 110402516 
Hon. David Mortensen 
On March 21, 2013, a hearing was held before the Court on Far West Bank's (hereinafter 
"Far West") motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim filed against it by Defendant 
Mike L. Robertson (hereinafter 11Robertson 11), Far West's motion for partial summary judgment 
on its deficiency claim against Defendant Robertson, and Defendant Robertson's motion for 
summary judgment against Far West. Steven W. Call and Jonathan A. Dibble of Ray, Quinney 
& Nebeker P.C. appeared on behalf of Far West. Defendant Robertson appeared with attorney 
Thomas E. Anthony, (hereinafter "Attorney Anthony") who made a limited appearance. The 
Court having considered the claims, counterclaims and legal positions at issue in the case, having 
heard the argument of counsel, and for cause appearing, hereby finds, concludes and orders as 
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On March 21, 2013, Attorney Anthony appeared at the hearing with Defendant 
Robertson and moved the Court for leave to make a limited appearance for the 
purpose of representing Defendant Robertson at the hearing. No objection to the 
limited appearance was made by Far West and the Court determined that Attorney 
Anthony should be permitted to make a limited appearance for Defendant 
Robertson. 
At hearing the Court heard and considered arguments and counter-arguments 
made by the respective attorneys in support and opposition to Far West' motion 
for summary judgment against Defendant Robertson's counterclaim, Far West's 
motion for partial summary judgment against Defendant Robertson, and 
Defendant Robertson's motion for summary judgment against Far West. 
During argument Defendant Robertson admitted to and stipulated that the 2009 
Promissory Note made in favor of Far West was secured by the 2006 o Trust 
Deed and the 2007 Trust Deed which had been conveyed for the benefit of Far 
West (hereinafter the "Trust Deeds"); 
4. The legal descriptions included the Trust Deeds, the Notices of Default, the 
Notices of Sale and the Trustee's Deeds were lawful because they contained the 
metes and bounds descriptions of the trust properties conveyed to secure the loan 
owing to Far West. A tax parcel identification number, which may be assigned to 
a property by a county recorder or a county assessor, does not constitute a legal 
description of property under the Utah foreclosure statutes. 
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5. The facts are undisputed and Defendant Robertson admitted at hearing that the 
Notices of Default and Notices of Trustees' Sales were properly served upon and 
received by Defendant Robertson. There was more than sufficient debt owing to 
Far West for the foreclosure of the Trust Deeds. 
6. The foreclosures of the Trust Deeds were lawfully conducted in compliance with 
the terms of the Trust Deeds and Utah law. Therefore, the Court should grant 
partial summary judgment in in favor of Far West against Defendant Robertson 
and conduct a brief evidentiary hearing on the following two issues: (a) the 
calculation of the balance owing under the 2009 Note at the time of the 
foreclosure sales and the fair market value of the trust properties at the time of the 
foreclosure sales. 
7. The counterclaim filed by Defendant Robertson against Far West should be 
dismissed with prejudice for the following reasons. 
8. The counterclaim in negligence against Far West should be dismissed because it 
is barred by the economic loss doctrine as that doctrine has been applied by the 
Utah courts. In addition, Robertson stipulated at hearing that the negligence claim 
against Far West could be dismissed with prejudice. 
9. Defendant Robertson does not have a claim for breach of contract arising from the 
foreclosure of the Trust Deeds, the cancellation of the ACH Agreement or any 
other loan document or Agreement. The ACH Agreement unequivocally provided 
that either party could cancel the agreement within ten ( 10) days' notice. The 
facts are undisputed that Far West gave more than twenty (20) days' notice of 
cancellation of the ACH Agreement to Defendant Robertson and therefore Far 
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West fully complied with the termination terms of the ACH Agreement. 
10. Because the Far West Trust Deeds were foreclosed in compliance with their terms 
and applicable Utah law and because Far West terminated the ACH Agreement 
pursuant to its terms, Far West did not breach any implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in connection with any of the foregoing documents or 
agreements. 
11. The Court also rejects Defendant Robertson's argument that the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing may be treated as tort-type claim or that an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing may contradict specific written terms of an 
agreement. 
12. Utah"law bars a claim for unjust enrichment when there are written agreements 
governing the subject matter upon which the unjust enrichment claim is based. 
The facts are undisputed that there were written loan agreements made between 
Far West and Defendant Robertson concerning the subject matter of Defendant 
Robertson's unjust enrichment claim. Therefore, Defendant Robertson's claim 
for unjust enrichment should also be dismissed with prejudice. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing findings of undisputed facts and conclusions of law, the Court 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. The motion for leave to make a limited appearance on behalf of Defendant 
Robertson made by Attorney Anthony is granted and his limited appearance is 
approved by the Court; 
2. Far West Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment against the counterclaims filed 
000686 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[.- :.·I 
!.: ·::. ··.:.1 
against it by Defendant Robertson is hereby granted and all counterclaims alleged 
against Far West by Defendant Robertson are hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
3. Far West's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Robertson is 
granted all on issues and claims with the exception that the Court will conduct a 
brief evidentiary hearing to determine the balance owing to Far West by 
Defendant Robertson under the 2009 Note and the fair market value of the trust 
properties at the time of the foreclosure sales; and 
4. Defendant Robertson's motion for summary judgment against Far West is hereby 
denied with prejudice. 
DATED this __ day of April, 2013. 
BY THE COURT 
HON. DAVID N. MORTENSON 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form and content: 
Mike L. Robertson 
Thomas E. Anthony 
Limited Appearance Attorney for Mike L. Robertson 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST MIKEL. ROBERTSON'S COUNTERCLAIM AND PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF FAR WEST BANK was mailed, postage prepaid, on this 
_5th_ day of April, 2013 to the following: 
Mike L. Robertson 
444 W. Center 
Provo, UT 84601 
Thomas E. Anthony 
389 North University Ave. 
Provo, UT 84603 
Isl Steven W. Call 
000684 
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Prepared and submitted by: 
STEVEN W. CALL (5260) 
JONATHAN A. DIBBLE (0881) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Plaintiff American West Bank 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICANWEST BANK, a Washington 
Corporation, formerly doing business in Utah as 
Far West Bank, 
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant, 
vs. 
MIKEL. ROBERTSON, an individual, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. 
[Proposed] 
JUDGMENT 
AGAINST MIKEL. ROBERTSON 
Civil No. 110402516 
Hon. David Mortensen 
On July 2, 2013, a trial was held before the Court on the deficiency claims alleged against 
Mike L. Robertson. Far West Bank, now known as American West Bank ("American West") 
was represented by Jonathan A. Dibble and Steven W. Call of Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. 
Defendant Robertson appeared and defended himself. The Court having considered the evidence 
presented to the Court at trial including the testimony given by witnesses and having received 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I ._, 
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into evidence documents and related materials and having heretofore signed and entered its prior 
order of summary judgment against Defendant Robertson and partial summary judgment in favor 
of American West, hereby makes its findings, conclusions and judgment against Defendant Mike 
L. Robertson ("Robertson") as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I .Defendant Robertson entered into a loan transaction with American West on 
August 21, 2006. In connection with the loan Defendant Robertson, executed a 
Promissory Note ( the "2006 Note") in the amount of $230,000 in favor of 
American West. 
2.As part of the loan transaction Round Peak National Seed Farms, Ltd. (the 
"Round Peak Partnership") through its general partner, Robertson, executed a Revolving 
Credit Deed of Trust (the "2006 Trust Deed") in favor of American West, as trustee and 
beneficiary, to secure the 2006 Note. 
3. The 2006 Trust Deed conveyed to the trustee the power to sell the trust property 
described therein on Exhibit A as 67.4 acres of hillside land at approximately 500 North 
1100 East, Springville, Utah (the "Trust Property"). The 2006 Trust Deed was recorded 
on October 10, 2006 as Entry 109306:2006 in the Utah County Recorder's Office. 
4.On October 6, 2006, the Round Peak Partnership, through its general partner, 
Robertson, executed a modification of the amount of2006 Trust Deed from $230,000 to 
$500,000.00. The modification was recorded on October I 0, 2006 as Entry No. 
134222:2006 in the Utah County recorder's office. 
5.On September 12, 2007, Robertson executed a Promissory Note (the "2007 
Note") in the amount of $250,000.00 in favor of American West in exchange for a loan of 
2 
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$250,000.00. As part of the loan transaction, the Round Peak Partnership executed, 
through its general partner, Robertson, a Revolving Credit Deed of Trust (the "2007 Trust 
Deed") in favor of American West, as trustee and beneficiary, to secure the payment of a 
revolving line of credit. 
6.The 2007 Trust Deed was recorded September 13, 2007 as Entry No. 134636:2007 
in the Utah County recorder's office. The 2007 Trust Deed granted to the trustee the power 
to sell the Trust Property described therein. The 2006 Trust Deed and the 2007 Trust Deed 
both encumbered the same Trust Property. 
7.On April 23, 2009, Defendant Robertson executed a Promissory Note (the 
"Note 2009") in the amount of $669,726.32 in favor of American West. The promissory 
note consolidated obligations owing under the 2006 Note and the 2007 Note. 
8.The obligations owing under the 2009 Note were secured by the 2006 Trust Deed 
(as modified) and the 2007 Trust Deed. 
9.Certain events of default occurred including that Robertson failed to make timely 
payments under the 2009 Note. As a result, Notices of Default were recorded on January 
13, 2011 as Entries 4120:2011 and 4122:2011 with the Utah County recorder's office. The 
Notices of Default were duly served upon Robertson as the borrower and upon Round Peak 
Partnership as the trustor under the 2006 Trust Deed and the 2007 Trust Deed. 
1 0.Defendant Robertson failed to cure the default during the statutory period 
required by Utah law and the Trust Property was noticed for sale through the substituted 
trustee's notices (the "Trustee's") of Trustee's Sale. The Notices of Trustee's Sale were 
duly served on Robertson and Round Peak Partnership and were published and posted as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-25 and Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26. 
3 
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11. On the date of the Trustee's Sales the amount due and owing to American West 
under the 2009 Note was no less than $693,513.97, plus additional attorneys' fees and costs. 
12.Under the terms of the 2007 Trust Deed, the Trustee sold the Trust Property to 
American West on June 1, 2011 on or around 2:00 p.m. for the sum of $135,000 in 
accordance with the terms and conditions in the 2007 Trust Deed and pursuant to Utah law 
including Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 through§ 57-1-28 (as amended). The Trustee's Deed 
relating to the foreclosure sale was duly executed by the Trustee and recorded on June 6, 
2011 as Entry 41867:2011. After the foregoing sale, the amount owing on the 2009 Note, 
prior to additional attorneys' fees, costs etc. was no less $558,513.97. 
13.The Trustee foreclosed the 2006 Trust Deed, as modified, on June 1, 2011 on or 
aroW1d 2: 15 p.m. Under the terms of the 2006 Trust Deed, the Trustee sold the Trust 
Property to American West for the sum of $268,000 in accordance with the terms and 
conditions in the 2006 Trust Deed, as modified, and pursuant to Utah law including Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-23 through§ 57-1-28 (as amended). The Trustee's Deed relating to the 
foreclosure sale under the 2006 Trust Deed was duly executed by the Trustee and recorded 
on June 6, 2011 as Entry 41868:2011. 
14.After the Trust Deeds were foreclosed, American West timely commenced a 
deficiency action against Defendant Robertson pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-32. 
American West alleged in its complaint that the combined credit bids of$403,000 made 
by American West at the foreclosure were greater in amount than the fair market value of 
the Trust Property. Nevertheless, American West sought its deficiency balance based 
upon the credit-bid sum of $403,000. 
15.Defendant Robertson answered and counterclaimed against American West 
4 0 ,. .... -5 ,~93 0.1.v 
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alleging several claims for relief . 
16.After discovery was conducted, cross motions for summary judgment were 
filed by the parties, and a hearing was held before the Court on the motions. After 
considering the materials filed in support and opposition to the motions and having heard 
the argument of counsel, the Court granted American West's motion for summary 
judgment against Defendant Robertson's counterclaims. American West's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Robertson was also granted all on issues 
and claims with the exception that the Court would conduct a trial to determine the 
balance owing Defendant Robertson to American West by under the 2009 Note and the 
fair market value of the Trust Properties at the time of the foreclosure sales. The Court 
scheduled a trial to commence on July 2, 2013. 
17. The Court previously signed and entered its Summary Judgment against Mike 
L. Robertson's Counterclaim and Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Far West Bank. 
18.On July 2, 2013, a trial was held before the Court on the remaining issues in 
the case. Jonathan A. Dibble and Steven W. Call of Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. 
appeared on behalf of American West, and Defendant Robertson appeared on his own 
behalf. 
19.Brian Guevara, a bank officer for American West, appeared and testified on 
behalf of American West concerning the balance owing to American West at the time the 
Trust Deeds were foreclosed, the application of the proceeds from the foreclosure sale, 
and the calculation of the deficiency balance owing to American West. Various exhibits 
were presented and received by the Court during Mr. Guevara's examination. 
20.Travis Reeves, an MAI appraiser, appeared as an expert witness and testified 
5 
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concerning the fair market value of the Trust Property at the time the foreclosure sales 
were conducted. The Court received into evidence his appraisal report and his opinion as 
to the fair market value of the Trust Property at the time of the foreclosure sales. Mr. 
Reeves opined that the fair market value of the Trust Property at the time of the 
foreclosure sales was $340,000, which is less than $63,000 less than the sum credit bid by 
the Bank. 
21.The Court received into evidence American West's Exhibits 1 through 29 
through testimony given by Brian Guevara and/or Travis Reeves. 
22.Defendant Robertson was also called as a witness. He gave testimony 
concerning facts relating to the value of the Trust Property at the time of the foreclose 
sales. The Court also received various exhibits into evidence presented by Defendant 
Robertson. The Court refused to permit an expert witness to appear and testify for 
Robertson because the expert witness had never been identified or disclosed until the 
witness was called to testify at trial. 
23 .At the conclusion of the hearing the Court received into evidence an attorneys' 
fee affidavit for American West which provided detailed information concerning the 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by American West in the case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
24.The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah 
Const. art. VIIL § 5 and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102. 
25.The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Robertson pursuant to the 
service of process made upon him and pursuant to his appearance in the case. The Court 
has personal jurisdiction over American West pursuant to its appearance in the case. 
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26.Venue is proper in the Fourth District Court in and for Utah County, State of 
Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§§ 78B-3-301 and 304 because the deficiency action 
commenced by American West relates to the foreclosure of real property located in Utah 
County. 
27 .Based upon the testimony presented at trial and the documents received into 
evidence, the Court concludes by a preponderance of evidence that the total indebtedness 
owing by Defendant Robertson at the time the trust property was foreclosed on June 1, 
2011 was $693,513.97. 
28.Based upon the testimony given at trial and the documents received into 
evidence which set forth the calculation of indebtedness, the Court concludes by a 
preponderance of evidence that the total indebtedness was reduced by the credit bids by 
American West in the sum of$403,000, of which $27,785.98 was applied to interest and 
$375,214.02 was applied to principal in compliance with the loan documents. 
29 .Based upon the testimony given at trial and the documents received into 
evidence, the Court concludes that the fair market value of the property in the amount of 
$340,000 at the time of the foreclosure sales was less than the $403,000 amount credit-
bid by American West for the purchase of the Trust Property. Therefore the indebtedness 
was reduced by an amount greater than the fair market value of the Property. 
30.Based upon the foregoing, the deficiency balance owing to American West as 
of July 1, 2013 was $416,216.80. 
31.As the prevailing party in the case American West is entitled to an award of 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in the case pursuant to the loan documents made 
between the parties. No timely objection was filed to the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees 
7 
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and Costs submitted by American West and the Court concludes pursuant to Rule 73 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the attorneys' fees and costs therein are reasonable 
given the claims, counterclaims, proceedings and trial in the case. Therefore, 
American West should be awarded $104,468.08 in attorneys' fees and $7,715.98 in costs. 
32.The objections or motions for reconsideration filed by Defendant Robertson 
were denied for the reasons set forth in this Court's prior rulings. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, the Court orders, adjudges and 
decrees against Defendant Michael L. Robertson as follows: 
I.Pursuant to American West's First and Second Claims for Relief, a money 
judgment is made in favor of American West against Defendant Robertson in the amount of 
$416,216.80 as of July 1, 2013; 
2.Pursuant to American West's First and Second Claims for Relief, a money 
judgment is made in favor of American West against Defendant Robertson in the amount of 
$167.14 per diem (i.e., $290,513.97 in principal times 21 % percent divided by 365 days) 
from July 1, 2013 through the entry of this Judgment pursuant to the terms of the default 
contract rate of interest set forth in loan documents made between the parties; 
3.Pursuant to American West's Third Claim for Relief, a money judgment is made 
against Defendant Robertson for reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $104,468.08 
and costs and expenses in the amount of$7,715.98; 
4.This judgment shall accrue post-judgment interest at the default contract rate of 
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interest of twenty-one percent (21%) until paid based upon the loan docµments made 
between the parties pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4; 
5.Thisjudgment shall be augmented by an award of reasonable attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred by American West in enforcing this Judgment pursuant to the terms of 
the loan documents made between the parties; 
6.Pursuant to this Court's prior ruling on American West's motion for summary 
judgment, all counterclaims alleged against American West by Defei;idant Robertson are 
dismissed with prejudice; and 
7.This Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10/22/2008 16:11 8013748583 
Oct. H, 2008 10: !BAM 
This 119reement Is made thl11 14th day of Pot61xlr 
(the 'company") and filr West Bani!:/ e flni:lncml company. 
L&l-i TR.ADE CEHT.ER PAGE 01/02 
Uo .. 1162 P. 2 
-4,CH ORIGINATION AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN FAR. WEST BANK AW P 
Mike Robertson 
, 2D0B bet:Ween Mike RobMSOn 
The o:1mp11ny has requested th~t- Far West !!.an~ permit It to 1n1b11ti: ele(:trt)nlc s1gr.Dla tor paperless entry (entl'I&&) 
through fi:lf West Sank t9 accounts maintained 11t Par W~t Bani< and In 1>thtr Flntu'ldal Inat:11:\Jtlons, 'r:t( means of the 
automated dsarlng houso (the AOi) operated by Northw~rt Cle.arlng House Asaocletlon, (NWCHA), 
ACH Cradlt Umlt_..,... ... $.,.7.;;;5_,._1<>;.;;.0.;.D,:.;;.0.;.6 __ 
@1'1'D DCC]) Derx · OWT:B 
ACfi l>eln7: Llmlc __ _._$7 __ 5_,, __ 0..::.D .... D.;..;,O;..;;O __ 
Acc01.1nt Number Z.01416B07 
Now, t:tierefore,"111 c:ol'IS!d~tlon or mut.ual promises contained herein, It Is agree~ 1;1S follows: 
t, The comp!lny Will comply with ttie Northwest e!eliring Hciuse AssOd&tlon nu~ and the laws of the Unlted 
states prasantly In effect; however, !hey rmy chan,ge fr¢rn time to time. _The dutlr:-ll <>f th!l company set r9rth lr'I the 
fofloWl/'lg p&ragraphs-of thls agreemel'lt ht no way llmltll the requirement: qf complying with the rtlles or 1h11 laws. A 
· copy ofth~ rules rney l>e obtained from ftlrW~t B11n1<.upon request. · · · 
2. · far west ~anK will tn1nsm!t the cnidlt ana debit enti1es Initiated by the cornpimy to the ACH as proVl<!e.d In the· 
IUJI~ lil\d hiv1s- of this a11ree.mel'lt. 
l, Toe company will obtain from each of Its tu~~mer, an authorization tQ milke one or more entries to the 
custom·ers account. Th~ carnpany W\11 retain the or1gln;d or a CtJPY or such authortz:atlon ror slX (6) years arter 
term1natlcf'! er tevocatl_on oF such· 11~th1;,rh:otlon. · 
t. Toe compl\nY Will ~rovlde entry (entries) lnforrnatlcn on the m11tually l\greea upon medium an~ In the format 
spacJMed by for We.51: eank. 
S. Each eill:Jy or Olo of ontrle.& shell "be dellVel'9d to the lt>Ctltlon spectrted by Far Wert Bank In accorc!anc11 with. 
tl\u tlma sc:hedule set rotth 1n AppondJ:,c A to tl\l!I a~reem~nt. 
6, The company win provlge ft.111ds to cover ony cr11a1t entry Initiated by I~ .as aat forth ln Appen~b: A to this 
egra~ent, 
·7, The compeny wlll retelvo tunda tor any debit enby It !nltlates on the day mutually ograed upon by tha 
wmpany and Far West Bank. 
8. If the 1:0mpany dlscovors th~t 11nY entry It ha1' loltlstad wus ln arror, It may notify' Fal' Waot Biinlc cf such errol' 
and Far We.;t Bank will ut.Jlb:.e Its. best efforts on behalf of the company, consistent with l:hei. rulas, to. correct th& 
entry, · • 
9, ln the. event any anb1es ere rejected by the AOi for ~ny rei1$0n whatsoever, It shall be. the responslblllt'{ cif 
the company to rema!Ce such entries; provided however, thet Far WBSt·B1inl< $hall remake such entries In any Cl!ue 
wh~re such reJectlon l>y the ACH was Clue to mishandling of such encnea by F~r We~ Bank and pufficlent Clam Is 
!!Vallable tll far W8llt Bani( to permit It to remek.Q such entrle.$. 11\6 componv shaU nitaln and provide Far Wes.t 
aank on requ,;;~ ~U lnfonnatlon nece;flllY' t-o remoJCe any nJa af entrtci; fol' t11ree days after mldn\sl>,t af the day the 
entries are m~de to the 01SI0mers account. _: 
10. Toa ccmp<1ny will provide funds to llidemnlfv Feir We,t Bank It any debit entrY Is rejected or lf adj11stment 
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Oct. 14. 2008 10: f8AM 
L&M TRADE CENTER PAGE 92/B~ 
Ho. 1182 P, 3 
lL With respect to art,/ entries lnltlatl,d by the aimpany, th11 company wlH lnd11111nl!y Far We&t B11nlt.lf Far West 
Bank Incurs flny IOBB or llnbl\ltf, except !'or lass= solaly.attrlbutable tv Fer West Banl('s ll"'> nagUgenm, resvllfnJ 
ft'oml 
(A) Entries .upplled by the COin~ to Par West Bank for procen1n9 to accounbl 
maintained 11c Fir West Qank, or • 
(&) 1ba breach of any 1'f tha warranties ot an originating ftnanclal lnstltvl:IDll contained 111 
~- nrlas. 
12. Tha monthly charge for thlll nrvlce ls p.5 per montti, arid tha charge t'or each ACH lnnsal:tlon Initiated IS 
$0.10. Ad~ltlonal charaes may apply tor returned Items; NSF transsctlons and olher pertinent tren&ac«ona. The 
charges tqr these services may bi SllbjecUo change rit any time. · • 
13. In lhe event ttie ccrnpanv lnaun &'/ti 109s due to mlsl\11ndlln11 of a partlcvlar anby gr entries, Far West Pank'1 
llubdity to the company sl'l~I be llmltad to: ' 
(A) LDQ:es resulting from 11:S' ~n negDgam:e or. 
(B) 111 the event Far West L'.ank Is not negftgcni, the amount recov~ble by Par West ~k . • 
rrom riny third party pursuant to l:Jle f\lleS•or any lndamnltY agreement. 
14. This agreemerit may be tennlncitt:d on a tan dliys ~a:an nobca by ehhar party, provided that appllcable 
portion$· or this aeraa:mcnl: allaJI rernDln In ~ with respa.ct to any anb1es 1n1t1atect by tha company prior t0 alldl 
termination, 
ts. The. company" agrees to 11!1tabl1Sh prudent security 11land11rds and pollaes mat lndude pn,pet sa~uallls to 
protact the conlldentlalit:y of all I..Dgln IDs and PasSWordir that ere asS111nad to t>1ll company for lnllhltlna 
trall&llc:tlons using this systum. "f,.ny tr1111Sad:lon lnltl.ted or autflor1ZBd uslttg a valid combination of a Login !D and 
Password wlll b11 col'tsldered au~nt1r:, valid and binding bY the compnny and Fer West Pink. :r11a flnand,1 
1nstl1ut1on aoreu.tu pro\llde reasonable assistance. to establish Login ID£ and PassWords, training, and ,upport to 
the company ftir propany using the se.rvJou. lt the i;vmpany suspscts or .b.iteves any such lnl'annatJon has bal)n 
campromlsed1 It shall ln"1>edlatel'( conblct 681' West Bank. 
ln Witness whaniof, the undersigned ha~e duly mcecutecftha agreement by their duly authonzed,ol'ftcers. 
fllr W\:St Bank 
Signed Name: f I · 
lli:ltc~ 
Printed Name Printed Narne 
Title 
contact Phone Numbe~ 
I 
-I' 
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1. The effective date In the file Is the date that you want the money to be deposited to the accounts or 
debited From the accounts. 
2. In.order to ensure that the funds are transferred on the effective date, the e@ccess Cash Managen'lent 
flle must be submitted to the bank before 3:00 pm, two (2) business days prior to the effective date, 
3. Ttie •company" must have available funds In their account by 8:00 am on the effective date for the 
entrlBS orlglnated. 
000334 
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September 22, 2010 
Mike Robertson 
Instapolypay 
444 w: Center 
Provo, UT 84601 
Dear Mr. Robertson: 
I am writing to advise you that, in accordance with the terms of the ACH Agreement 
between Far West Bank and Instapolypay, Far West Bank is providing you notice of 
termination of ACH services. The decision has been made to not renew the existing 
ACH relationship. 
The effective terntlnation date is Wednesday, October 13111, 2010. Ten.nination will tal<e 
effect at the open of business on that day. (This assumes your receipt of this notice on 
Monday, September 27th• Please advise me if you receive this notice after that date). 
Please note the minimum one business day settlement interval to which your ACH entries 
are subject, such that your final origination date is Friday, October 8th, and your final 
settlement date is Tuesday, October 12tl1. 
If you have questions regarding thls notice, please feel free to contact myself or Brian 
Guevara at 801-342-9712. 
Jeffrey Rounds, CTP 
Vice President 
Cash Management 
Fer West Ban.le 
801-208-4078 
South Jordan Office 10757 5. River Front Parkway Suite 150 South Jordan, UT 84095 (801) 207-40n (801) 208-3486 fu: 
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October 12, 2010 
Mike Robertson 
Instapolypay 
444 W. Center 
Provo, UT 84601 
Dear Mr. Robertson: 
In reference to Far West Bank's Jetter dated September 22,.2010, (copy attached) Far 
West Bank has elected to extend the cancellation date to October 21 s to allow the 
company additional time to make alternate ACH arrangements. 
The effective termination date is Thursday, October 21st, 2010. Termination will take 
effect at the open of business on that day, (This assumes your receipt of this notice via 
USPS on Thursday, October 14th• Please advise me if you receive this notice after that 
date). 
Please note the minimum one day settlement interval to which your ACH entries are 
subject, such that yourfinal origination dale is Tuesday, October 191\ and your final 
settlement date is Wednesday, October 20th• . . 
If you have questions regarding this notice, please contact me. 
~\ 
Jeffrey Rounds, CTP 
Vice President 
Cash Management 
Far West Bank 
801·208-4078 
CC: Nicole Sherman, Jason Hester, 
Encl: 
South Jordan Office 10757 S. River Front Parkway Suire 150 SouchJorcwi, UT 84095 (801) 207-4077 (801) 208-3486 fax 
000330 
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